9ns --mntgen: registry subdirectories are mount points too

A registry entry that is a directory is now served the way the root is:
a synthetic directory listing the real one, dialing the sockets inside
it on walk and recursing into further directories, to max_synth_depth
(8) levels across max_synth_dirs (64) synthetic nodes. That is the
plan9port mntgen shape and the layout zmx now posts under, so a live
session reads at /mnt/9p/zmx/<name>. Before this a directory in the
registry was dialed like a socket and answered EIO for good.

post gains the two entry points the traversal needs: postedDir (the
registry scan, against any directory) and dialPath (a dial by composed
path, no name validation).

Hardening, each from an attack that broke the code:

- BATCH_FORGET carries entries for many owners and puts 0 in the header
  nodeid, so routing it by the header dropped all of them: 32 of 64
  synthetic slots leaked in one close burst and the subdirectories that
  held them answered EIO forever. distributeForgets unpacks the body and
  hands each entry to its owner.
- probe() and connectBlocking() copied a caller's path into the kernel
  address with no bound: a path past sun_path overran the 110-byte stack
  sockaddr (a panic in Debug, silent corruption in ReleaseFast). Both
  refuse it now, probe as `.live` so a claim never deletes what it could
  not inspect.
- That bound then caught 9proc's own listener, which handed probe() the
  whole 108-byte sun_path array instead of the path inside it. The probe
  reads `.live` for anything it cannot ask about, so every stale socket
  became AlreadyListening and no server could ever take a dead
  predecessor's name back. It passes the path now.

Suites: 87/87 root (+7 post/serve attack regressions), 48/48 9ns,
51+88 9ns integration (+4 traversal and slot-recycling checks), 213/0
9ns adversarial, 60/60 9proc plus its adversarial suites with a new
stale-socket takeover check, freestanding green.

1 files changed, 34 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/9proc/test/adv_linux_probe.py b/9proc/test/adv_linux_probe.py
index 186f008..c921ebb 100755
--- a/9proc/test/adv_linux_probe.py
+++ b/9proc/test/adv_linux_probe.py
@@ -289,6 +289,40 @@ def attack_signals(server):
     ok("SIGTERM unlinks the unix socket (clean stop path)", not os.path.exists(path))
     s.stop()
 
+    # A server killed outright leaves its socket behind. The next server
+    # of the same name must recognise the corpse and take the name over:
+    # the listener probes the path, and a probe that cannot tell answers
+    # "live", so a caller that hands it the whole 108-byte sun_path array
+    # instead of the path turns every stale socket into AlreadyListening.
+    s = Srv(server)
+    client(s.path, timeout=5)
+    stale = s.path
+    s.proc.send_signal(signal.SIGKILL)
+    s.proc.wait(timeout=5)
+    ok("SIGKILL leaves the socket behind", os.path.exists(stale))
+    taker = subprocess.Popen([server, "--unix", stale], stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
+    try:
+        # The path exists throughout (the corpse, then the new socket), so
+        # the connect itself is the readiness signal.
+        err, c = None, None
+        for _ in range(250):
+            try:
+                c = client(stale, timeout=10)
+                break
+            except OSError as e:
+                err = e
+                time.sleep(0.02)
+        ok("a fresh server takes over a stale socket path",
+           c is not None and rd(c, [b"build", b"zig_version"])[0] == Rread,
+           err or taker.poll())
+    except Exception as e:
+        ok("a fresh server takes over a stale socket path", False, e)
+    finally:
+        taker.kill()
+        taker.wait(timeout=5)
+    if os.path.exists(stale):
+        os.unlink(stale)
+
 
 def attack_probe(ns, server):
     print("# probe loop and admission")